Publications Database

Welcome to the new Schulich Peer-Reviewed Publication Database!

The database is currently in beta-testing and will be updated with more features as time goes on. In the meantime, stakeholders are free to explore our faculty’s numerous works. The left-hand panel affords the ability to search by the following:

  • Faculty Member’s Name;
  • Area of Expertise;
  • Whether the Publication is Open-Access (free for public download);
  • Journal Name; and
  • Date Range.

At present, the database covers publications from 2012 to 2020, but will extend further back in the future. In addition to listing publications, the database includes two types of impact metrics: Altmetrics and Plum. The database will be updated annually with most recent publications from our faculty.

If you have any questions or input, please don’t hesitate to get in touch.


Search Results

Bosse, D.A. and Phillips, R.A. (2016). "Agency Theory and Bounded Self Interest", Academy of Management Review, 41(2), 276-297.

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Abstract Agency theory draws attention to certain behaviors of CEOs and boards that, in aggregate, create losses for society. The empirical literature, however, characterized by contentious findings, suggests that the current form of agency theory is not supporting a clear understanding of these behaviors and their costs. We propose a change to one assumption, with potentially profound implications. Expanding on the assumption of narrow self-interest underlying agency theory, we apply an empirically well-established refinement that self-interest is bounded by norms of reciprocity and fairness. The resulting logic is that perceptions of fairness mediate the relationships derived from standard agency theory through positively and negatively reciprocal behaviors. This mediating variable provides a parsimonious new way to help explain extreme results found in prior studies. Rather than aiming to limit CEOs’ self-serving behaviors, boards that apply these arguments improve social welfare by initiating positive reciprocity and avoiding unnecessary, welfare-reducing “revenge” behaviors.

Gomaa, M., Kanagaretnam, K., Mestelman, S. and Shehata, M. (2015). "Exercising Empowerment in an Investment Environment", Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 7, 33-41.

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Abstract Using data from a laboratory-controlled environment we analyze the decisions of principals to veto the allocations of grossed-up investments proposed by their agents in a modified trust game. Using probit analysis, we find that the trust displayed by the principal and the trustworthiness of the agent are statistically significant variables in estimating the likelihood that a principal will exercise a veto and that the notion of fairness is important in explaining veto decisions. We also analyze the surpluses before and after the exercise of vetoes and find that potential surpluses rise with the introduction of empowerment. However, actual gains are not different from those realized in environments in which principals are not empowered. This result is qualified by the recognition that the number of decision rounds that are played by the participants in this experiment may not be sufficient for the full effect of empowerment to be realized.

Kanagaretnam, K., Mestelman, S., Nainar, S.M.K. and Shehata, M. (2014). "Transparency and Empowerment in an Investment Environment", Journal of Business Research, 67(9), 2030-2038.

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Abstract In a laboratory-controlled environment we provide experimental evidence on the effects of transparency (complete over incomplete information) and empowerment on trust and trustworthiness. We implement a simple version of the standard two-person investment game in a repeated game context with multiple treatments under two information environments. We find that when principals are empowered by being able to penalize agents who may not act in a way the principal believes is in the principal's best interest, the level of trust and investment increases over that which is realized in the absence of empowerment regardless of the degree of transparency. In transparent environments the effect of empowerment is about the same regardless of whether empowerment is introduced or removed. However, in opaque environments, the loss of empowerment has a substantially greater negative effect on trust than the positive effect associated with the introduction of empowerment.

Belk, R. (2014). "Sharing Versus Pseudo-Sharing in Web 2.0", The Anthropologist, 18(1), 50.

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Abstract The Internet has opened up a new era in sharing. There has also been an explosion of studies and writings about sharing via the Internet. This includes a series of books, articles, and web discussions on the topic. However, many of these apparent cases of sharing are better characterized as pseudo-sharing — commodity exchanges wrapped in a vocabulary of sharing. The present paper reviews subsequent research and theorizing as well as controversies that have emerged surrounding sharing and what is best regarded as pseudo-sharing — a wolf-insheep’s-clothing phenomenon whereby commodity exchange and potential exploitation of consumer co-creators present themselves in the guise of sharing. The paper begins with a pair of vignettes that highlight some of the contested meanings of sharing. By detailing four types of pseudo-sharing and four types of sharing that are specifically enabled or enhanced by Internet technologies, the paper argues that pseudo-sharing is distinguished by the presence of profit motives, the absence of feelings of community, and expectations of reciprocity. It concludes with a discussion of theoretical, practical, and ethical implications of pseudo-sharing and offer suggestions for future research.

Kanagaretnam, K., Mestelman, S., Nainar, S. and Shehata, M. (2012). "The Impact of Empowering Investors on Trust and Trustworthiness", Journal of Economic Psychology, 33, 566–577.

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Abstract This paper uses a controlled laboratory environment and a two-person investment game in a multi-period setting to examine the impact of empowering investors with the right to veto the investee’s profit distribution on trust and trustworthiness. Two forms of vetoes are tested: the first is costly for the investor to implement and the second is costless. One of the key findings is that the empowerment of investors through both costless and costly vetoes significantly increases trust by over 30% in both cases. To control for a treatment sequence effect, we conducted the experiment in a reverse order. We observe a comparable loss in trust when the power to veto is removed. Further analysis of veto decisions indicates that empowering investors increases both trust and trustworthiness without an undue abuse of the power to veto and that the veto decisions are mainly driven by unfair responses, consistent with the notion that most vetoes are cast by investors whose trust has been betrayed.