Publications Database

Welcome to the new Schulich Peer-Reviewed Publication Database!

The database is currently in beta-testing and will be updated with more features as time goes on. In the meantime, stakeholders are free to explore our faculty’s numerous works. The left-hand panel affords the ability to search by the following:

  • Faculty Member’s Name;
  • Area of Expertise;
  • Whether the Publication is Open-Access (free for public download);
  • Journal Name; and
  • Date Range.

At present, the database covers publications from 2012 to 2020, but will extend further back in the future. In addition to listing publications, the database includes two types of impact metrics: Altmetrics and Plum. The database will be updated annually with most recent publications from our faculty.

If you have any questions or input, please don’t hesitate to get in touch.

 

Search Results

Chung, J. and Hsu, S. (2017). "The Effect of Cognitive Moral Development on Honesty in Managerial Reporting", Journal of Business Ethics, 145(3), 563–575.

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Keywords
Abstract This study examines whether truth-telling in the form of honest reporting is associated with cognitive moral development. Conventional agency theory assumes that people are self-interested and willing to tell a lie to increase their personal payoffs, while recent empirical evidence shows that some people give up monetary rewards to tell the truth (e.g., Evans et al., Account Rev 76:537–559, 2001). The social psychology literature suggests that cognitive moral development influences individuals’ ethical decisions. We carried out an experiment whereby participants submitted managerial reports in which truth-telling decreased their monetary payoff. Despite the fact that their decisions were not subject to monitoring, auditing, or reputation effects, some participants reported honestly or partially honestly. We find the relationship between honest reporting and cognitive moral development to be both positive and linear. Compared with those at lower stages of cognitive moral development, participants at higher stages of cognitive moral development were more likely to submit an honest report and give up potential monetary gains from lying. We further examine the economic impact of honest reporting on the firm’s profit. With the assumption of self-interest and profit maximization, Antle and Eppen (Manag Sci 31:163–174, 1985) suggest that a contract with a hurdle-rate feature reduces managers’ information rent. We find that in comparison with the expected outcome of a hurdle contract, the firm can yield higher profits with a trust contract by hiring managers with a P-score higher than 16.67.

Bosse, D.A. and Phillips, R.A. (2016). "Agency Theory and Bounded Self Interest", Academy of Management Review, 41(2), 276-297.

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Keywords
Abstract Agency theory draws attention to certain behaviors of CEOs and boards that, in aggregate, create losses for society. The empirical literature, however, characterized by contentious findings, suggests that the current form of agency theory is not supporting a clear understanding of these behaviors and their costs. We propose a change to one assumption, with potentially profound implications. Expanding on the assumption of narrow self-interest underlying agency theory, we apply an empirically well-established refinement that self-interest is bounded by norms of reciprocity and fairness. The resulting logic is that perceptions of fairness mediate the relationships derived from standard agency theory through positively and negatively reciprocal behaviors. This mediating variable provides a parsimonious new way to help explain extreme results found in prior studies. Rather than aiming to limit CEOs’ self-serving behaviors, boards that apply these arguments improve social welfare by initiating positive reciprocity and avoiding unnecessary, welfare-reducing “revenge” behaviors.