Publications Database
Welcome to the new Schulich Peer-Reviewed Publication Database!
The database is currently in beta-testing and will be updated with more features as time goes on. In the meantime, stakeholders are free to explore our faculty’s numerous works. The left-hand panel affords the ability to search by the following:
- Faculty Member’s Name;
- Area of Expertise;
- Whether the Publication is Open-Access (free for public download);
- Journal Name; and
- Date Range.
At present, the database covers publications from 2012 to 2020, but will extend further back in the future. In addition to listing publications, the database includes two types of impact metrics: Altmetrics and Plum. The database will be updated annually with most recent publications from our faculty.
If you have any questions or input, please don’t hesitate to get in touch.
Search Results
Massimo Sargiacomo, Jeff Everett, Luca Ianni, Antonio D'Andreamatteo (2024). "Auditing for Fraud and Corruption: A Public-Interest-Based Definition and Analysis", The British Accounting Review, 56(2), 101355.
Abstract
To better understand how the practice of auditing can be more effectively enrolled in the fight against fraud and corruption, this study (1) examines how these problems are viewed and defined by the public and (2) contrasts this view and definition with that of professional auditors. The examination is informed by the dispositive theory of Foucault and an inductive analysis of a large (90,000+) multi-year sample of news stories related to fraud and corruption in the Italian health sector. While auditors define these problems in relatively narrow terms and consign them to ‘a form of risk, a threat to reputation and revenue, and a cost of doing business,’ the study finds that the public has a broader definition and a greater concern with problematic acts and actors ‘in and of themselves’. These findings have important implications for the audit expectations gap and how it might be addressed. The study also provides a useful analytical method for locating and better understanding fraud and corruption in other large, institutional settings.Alex Armand, Alexander Coutts, Pedro C. Vicente, Inês Vilela (2023). "Measuring Corruption in the Field Using Behavioral games", Journal of Public Economics, 218, 104799.
Abstract
Corruption is often harmful for economic development, yet it is difficult to measure due to its illicit nature. We propose a novel corruption game to characterize the interaction between actual political leaders and citizens, and implement it in Northern Mozambique. Contrary to the game-theoretic prediction, both leaders and citizens engage in corruption. Importantly, corruption in the game is correlated with real-world corruption by leaders: citizens send bribes to leaders whom we observe appropriating community money. In corrupt behavior, we identify an important trust dimension captured by a standard trust game.Khanindra Ch Das, Mantu Kumar Mahalik, Perry Sadorsky (2023). "Tax Provision by International Subsidiaries of Indian Extractive Industry Multinationals: Do Environmental Pollution and Corruption Matter?", Resources Policy, 80, 103231.
Abstract
Outward foreign direct investment in the extractive industry increases the availability of metals and minerals that run the economic engine in the home country. It is unclear, however, whether tax provision by subsidiaries of emerging multinationals in extractive sectors respond to environmental pollution and corruption in the host country. In this paper we examine the tax provision in the host countries by subsidiaries of private sector based emerging multinationals in the extractive resources (metals and mining) sector. The analysis is carried out through a two-step system dynamic panel data GMM estimation, using data from 86 international subsidiaries of 15 Indian multinationals in 31 host countries for the period 2010 to 2019. Tax provisioning is found to be lesser in countries with higher environmental pollution. Tax provision is higher in countries with greater prevalence of corruption. However, the interactive effect suggests that in the presence of environmental pollution the subsidiary tax provisioning is higher in host countries if there is better control of corruption. This indicates that low corruption will offset a decline in tax provision from higher pollution. Furthermore, subsidiaries are found to have lesser tax provisioning when the parent firm has a tax dispute in the home country, implying the role of firm behaviour in shaping tax contribution by subsidiaries. The results are robust to the organization of subsidiaries through offshore financial centres.Henriques, I., Lopez Velarde, D. and Pesqueira, L. (2021). "The Impact of Corruption and Poverty on NGO-Business Collaboration in Mexico", Voluntas, 32, 881-893.
Abstract
We examine the likelihood of collaboration between NGOs and business in persistent intense social contexts. Using social capital theory and the institutional void literature, we argue that an NGO’s stakeholder relations act as a valuable resource in the formation of the organization’s social capital and raise its potential value as a legitimate business partner relative to NGOs with weak or few relations. These relations, however, are moderated by the persistent intense social context in which the NGO finds itself. Using Mexican data, we find that the positive relationship between stakeholder interactions and the likelihood of NGO–business collaboration is weakened by greater poverty (ties are more difficult to establish) and strengthened by corruption (ties provide a trust signal).Mawani, A. and Trivedi, V.U. (2021). "Collusive vs. Coercively Corrupt Tax Auditors and their Impact on Tax Compliance", Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, vol 30.
Abstract
This study examines taxpayer compliance in the presence and absence of collusively corrupt tax auditors and compares it to taxpayer compliance in the presence and absence of coercively corrupt tax auditors. Our experimental results show that overall taxpayer compliance declines in the presence of a collusively corrupt tax auditor who accepts bribes that leave the taxpayer economically better off. In contrast, taxpayer compliance increases in the presence of coercive tax auditors who demand moderate bribes. This may reflect taxpayers’ attempt to create a moral distance between themselves and the corrupt auditor. However, such economic sacrifices disappear when the level of bribe demanded by coercive auditors is increased to a higher component of reported income, suggesting that taxpayers may be willing to bear only relatively modest costs to morally differentiate themselves from coercive tax auditors.Trivedi, V.U. and Mawani, A (2020). "Impact of Tax Advisors and Corrupt Tax Auditors on Taxpayers Compliance", Canadian Tax Journal, 68(3), 801-32.
Blanc, R., Branco, M.C., Cho, C.H. and Sopt, J. (2019). "Disclosure Responses to a Corruption Scandal: The Case of Siemens AG", Journal of Business Ethics, 156(2),545-561.
Abstract
In the current study, we examine the changes in disclosure practices on compliance and the fight against corruption at Siemens AG, a large German multinational corporation, over the period 2000–2011 during which a major corruption scandal was revealed. More specifically, we conduct a content analysis of the company’s annual reports and sustainability reports during that period to investigate the changes of Siemens’ corruption and compliance disclosure using both quantitative and qualitative methods. Through the lens of legitimacy theory, stakeholder analysis, and organizational façades, we find evidence that Siemens changed its compliance and corruption disclosure practices to repair its legitimacy in the wake of the 2006 corruption scandal. We analyze these strategies more closely by using the rational, progressive, and reputation façades framework (Abrahamson and Baumard in The Oxford Handbook of Organizational Decision Making, pp 437–452, 2008). Our primary findings suggest that the annual reports show peaks of disclosure amounts on corruption and compliance disclosures earlier than sustainability reports, which can be partly explained by analyzing the disclosures made about—and to—the different stakeholder groups. We find that the annual report focuses more on internal stakeholders such as employees, while the sustainability report focuses more on external stakeholders such as suppliers. We also find that the company uses the façades differently depending on which report is being analyzed.Belk, R. and Ghoshal, T. (2017). "The Kafka Quagmire for the Poor in India", Journal of Marketing Management, 33(17-18), 1559-1569.
Abstract
Khare and Varman present a compellingly pessimistic analysis of the plight of the poor in India. The dilemmas of the poor are often exacerbated by large corporations seeking to find ways to market products to impoverished emerging market consumers. In India, consumers are frequently hurt by these initiatives, small retailers may suffer, while corruption and trickery by petty bureaucrats and ruthless landlords help the rich get richer at the expense of the poor. The article by Khare and Varman is a scathing indictment based on detailed ethnographic evidence but it reveals only a fraction of the disadvantages and traps of disempowerment facing those Indians living lives of great precarity. In this comment, we seek to build upon Khare and Varman’s insightful analysis both in order to reinforce their conclusions about the Kafkaesque existence of India’s poor and to introduce some further considerations and complications that make the quagmire even more entrapping. We focus on four sources of these problems: patriarchy, bureaucracy and corruption, class and caste power and hierarchies, and uneven and inadequate infrastructure. We also highlight some largely individual and non-government initiatives that may offer hope of escaping this quagmire for the poor.Everett, J, Neu, D. and Rahaman, A.A. (2015). "Preventing Corruption within Government Procurement: Constructing the Disciplined and Ethical Subject", Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 28(1),49-61.