Publications Database
Welcome to the new Schulich Peer-Reviewed Publication Database!
The database is currently in beta-testing and will be updated with more features as time goes on. In the meantime, stakeholders are free to explore our faculty’s numerous works. The left-hand panel affords the ability to search by the following:
- Faculty Member’s Name;
- Area of Expertise;
- Whether the Publication is Open-Access (free for public download);
- Journal Name; and
- Date Range.
At present, the database covers publications from 2012 to 2020, but will extend further back in the future. In addition to listing publications, the database includes two types of impact metrics: Altmetrics and Plum. The database will be updated annually with most recent publications from our faculty.
If you have any questions or input, please don’t hesitate to get in touch.
Search Results
Ashwin W. Joshi (2025). "How and when incentives and collaboration are effective in fostering supplier component innovation: Insights from social exchange theory", Journal of Business Research, 189, 115131.
Abstract
Manufacturing firms implement two actions to foster component innovation by suppliers: (i) providing the supplier with incentives for component innovation and/or (ii) initiating a collaborative relationship with the supplier for this purpose. In this research, we draw from social exchange theory to investigate how and when each action fosters supplier component innovation. Regarding how innovation is fostered, we argue that by motivating supplier component innovation through both economic and non-economic rewards, incentives and collaboration, respectively, encourage this outcome. As for when such innovation is fostered, we argue that the supplier’s relative economic outcome is a key boundary condition determining the impact strength of manufacturer actions on supplier component innovation. The positive impact of incentives is strengthened when supplier relative economic outcome is high, while the positive impact of collaboration is strengthened when supplier relative non-economic outcome is high. Results from a survey of 188 supplier–manufacturer matched dyads support our hypotheses.Alex Armand, Alexander Coutts, Pedro C. Vicente, Inês Vilela (2023). "Measuring Corruption in the Field Using Behavioral games", Journal of Public Economics, 218, 104799.
Abstract
Corruption is often harmful for economic development, yet it is difficult to measure due to its illicit nature. We propose a novel corruption game to characterize the interaction between actual political leaders and citizens, and implement it in Northern Mozambique. Contrary to the game-theoretic prediction, both leaders and citizens engage in corruption. Importantly, corruption in the game is correlated with real-world corruption by leaders: citizens send bribes to leaders whom we observe appropriating community money. In corrupt behavior, we identify an important trust dimension captured by a standard trust game.Belk, R., Haruvy, E., Leszczyc, P., Allenby, G., Eckel, C., Fisher, F., Li, S., List, J., Ma, Y. and Wang, Y. (2020). "Fundraising Design: Key Issues, Unifying Framework, and Open Puzzles", Marketing Letters, 31, 371–380.