Publications Database

Welcome to the new Schulich Peer-Reviewed Publication Database!

The database is currently in beta-testing and will be updated with more features as time goes on. In the meantime, stakeholders are free to explore our faculty’s numerous works. The left-hand panel affords the ability to search by the following:

  • Faculty Member’s Name;
  • Area of Expertise;
  • Whether the Publication is Open-Access (free for public download);
  • Journal Name; and
  • Date Range.

At present, the database covers publications from 2012 to 2020, but will extend further back in the future. In addition to listing publications, the database includes two types of impact metrics: Altmetrics and Plum. The database will be updated annually with most recent publications from our faculty.

If you have any questions or input, please don’t hesitate to get in touch.

 

Search Results

Mawani, A. and Trivedi, V.U. (2021). "Collusive vs. Coercively Corrupt Tax Auditors and their Impact on Tax Compliance", Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, vol 30.

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Abstract This study examines taxpayer compliance in the presence and absence of collusively corrupt tax auditors and compares it to taxpayer compliance in the presence and absence of coercively corrupt tax auditors. Our experimental results show that overall taxpayer compliance declines in the presence of a collusively corrupt tax auditor who accepts bribes that leave the taxpayer economically better off. In contrast, taxpayer compliance increases in the presence of coercive tax auditors who demand moderate bribes. This may reflect taxpayers’ attempt to create a moral distance between themselves and the corrupt auditor. However, such economic sacrifices disappear when the level of bribe demanded by coercive auditors is increased to a higher component of reported income, suggesting that taxpayers may be willing to bear only relatively modest costs to morally differentiate themselves from coercive tax auditors.

Farrar, J., Massey, D.W., Osecki, E. and Thorne, L. (2020). "The Association Between Vertical Equity and Presidential Voting Behavior and Taxpayers’ Compliance", Journal of Business Ethics, 1-14.

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Abstract Since taking office, the President of the United States has consistently refused to make his tax returns available for public scrutiny. In so doing, he has broken with presidential tradition and kept people guessing about what his tax returns would show if they were disclosed. Interestingly enough, in the absence of concrete knowledge about the President’s tax circumstances, some taxpayers perceive that he did not pay his fair share and others perceive that he did. This situation presents an opportunity for us to consider how vertical equity perceptions about the President’s fair share of taxes, and identification with the President via voting behavior, are jointly associated with taxpayers’ compliance. Using insights from equity theory as reported in Adams (in: Berkowitz (ed) Advances in experimental social psychology, Academic Press, New York, 1965) and social learning theory as reported in Bandura (Social learning theory, General Learning Press, New York, 1971, Social learning theory, Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1977), we anticipate and find that those taxpayers who perceive that the President did not pay his fair share of taxes and who most closely socially identify with him have the lowest tax compliance. We use a survey of 600 American taxpayers to capture their perceptions of vertical equity, voting behavior, and tax compliance intentions. Our results may reflect that taxpayers who identify with the President will tend to model his tax-related actions, or may also indicate that some taxpayers vote for a president whose actions are similar to their own. Insights and implications for ethics and tax researchers and tax policy makers are discussed.

Farrar, J., Massey, D.W., Osecki, E. and Thorne, L. (2020). "Tax Fairness: Conceptual Foundations and Empirical Measurement", Journal of Business Ethics, 162(3), 487-503.

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Abstract Prior research shows taxpayers’ perceptions of fairness leads to greater cooperation and compliance with tax authorities. Yet our understanding of tax fairness has been hampered by its general reliance upon models and measures of fairness developed by organizational fairness research, even though fairness is a perception subject to contextual influences. Accordingly, we attempt to gain insight into the influence of contextual factors on fairness through the development of a theoretically based and empirically derived model of tax fairness, grounded in organizational literature, but empirically tested in the tax context. Our analysis shows the extent to which items and dimensions found in the organizational fairness literature reflect taxpayers’ perceptions of tax fairness. Most importantly, our findings contribute to fairness research by identifying the role of relevant comparison groups in affecting perceptions of fairness, and thereby extends our understanding of the role of context in affecting fairness perceptions. Furthermore, by identifying the dimensions and items incorporated in perceptions of tax fairness, our study provides a foundation for tax researchers and policy makers to determine how best to promote voluntary taxpayers’ compliance and in so doing, mitigate tax avoidance and tax evasion.

Farrar, J., Kaplan, S. and Thorne, L. (2019). "The Effect of Interactional Fairness and Detection on Taxpayers’ Compliance Intentions", Journal of Business Ethics, 154(1), 167-180.

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Abstract Although the role of fairness in tax compliance has been of increasing interest among the academic and professional tax communities, very little is known about the role of interactional fairness. Interactional fairness refers to the quality of the treatment provided to individuals from authority figures, such as tax authority representatives. We conduct an experiment using US taxpayers to examine the role of interactional fairness on tax compliance intentions, and how detection influences this relation. Taxpayers’ detection salience reflects their perceptions that they will be audited by the tax authority. Using insights from conditional cooperation theory, we predict and find that detection moderates the relation between interactional fairness and tax compliance intentions, such that the effect of interactional fairness on tax compliance intentions diminishes with higher detection. We discuss the implications of our results for tax policy.