Publications Database

Welcome to the new Schulich Peer-Reviewed Publication Database!

The database is currently in beta-testing and will be updated with more features as time goes on. In the meantime, stakeholders are free to explore our faculty’s numerous works. The left-hand panel affords the ability to search by the following:

  • Faculty Member’s Name;
  • Area of Expertise;
  • Whether the Publication is Open-Access (free for public download);
  • Journal Name; and
  • Date Range.

At present, the database covers publications from 2012 to 2020, but will extend further back in the future. In addition to listing publications, the database includes two types of impact metrics: Altmetrics and Plum. The database will be updated annually with most recent publications from our faculty.

If you have any questions or input, please don’t hesitate to get in touch.

 

Search Results

Vibhuti Dhingra, Harish Krishnan, and Juan Serpa (Forthcoming). "Project Networks and Reallocation Externalities", Management Science.

Keywords
Abstract A project involves several participants—including clients, contractors, and subcontractors—that work concurrently on multiple projects and allocate resources among them. This interdependency creates a network of otherwise unrelated projects. We map the network of U.S. government projects involving over 150,000 participants. We show that a seemingly localized disruption, affecting only one project site, eventually causes delays across unrelated projects. This is because participants opportunistically reallocate resources into disrupted projects, at the expense of other projects, triggering a domino effect of further reallocations in the network. Thus, the costs of on-site disruptions end up being shared by multiple participants in the network, rather than being fully absorbed by the affected project. Performance-based incentives, which reward contractors for timeliness, exacerbate these externalities by encouraging self-interested resource reallocation.

Everett, J, Neu, D. and Rahaman, A.A. (2015). "Preventing Corruption within Government Procurement: Constructing the Disciplined and Ethical Subject", Critical Perspectives on Accounting, 28(1),49-61.

View Paper

Keywords
Abstract This paper examines the role of internal controls and monitoring practices in corrupt contexts and how these controls and practices shape the ethics and moral behaviors of organizational actors. Specifically focusing on corruption in government procurement and drawing on the insights of Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, the paper proposes that effective anti-corruption practices depend upon an understanding and analysis of the practices and politics of visibility, and that effective ‘luminous arrangements’ have the potential to discourage corrupt practices and influence ethics within organizations. While such arrangements do not necessarily prevent corrupt practices, they do encourage certain actions and reactions among organizational actors, suggesting that organizational actors are at one and the same time free and autonomous, yet subject to and constructed by anti-corruption practices. These practices are thus both disciplinary and productive, affecting individuals in specific ways, while also benefitting the organizations for whom they work.