Publications Database

Welcome to the new Schulich Peer-Reviewed Publication Database!

The database is currently in beta-testing and will be updated with more features as time goes on. In the meantime, stakeholders are free to explore our faculty’s numerous works. The left-hand panel affords the ability to search by the following:

  • Faculty Member’s Name;
  • Area of Expertise;
  • Whether the Publication is Open-Access (free for public download);
  • Journal Name; and
  • Date Range.

At present, the database covers publications from 2012 to 2020, but will extend further back in the future. In addition to listing publications, the database includes two types of impact metrics: Altmetrics and Plum. The database will be updated annually with most recent publications from our faculty.

If you have any questions or input, please don’t hesitate to get in touch.

 

Search Results

Chen, Y.S., Goldstein, S.M. and Rungtusanatham, M. (2019). "Historical Supplier Performance and Strategic Relationship Dissolution: Unintentional but Serious Supplier Error as a Moderator", Decision Sciences, 50(6), 1224-1258.

Open Access Download

Keywords
Abstract How and why is the association between historical supplier performance and strategic relationship dissolution moderated by an unintentional but serious supplier error? Adopting Assimilation‐Contrast Theory, we propose that this moderation effect can be either negative or positive. As an empirical test, we collected and analyzed data from 256 sourcing professionals participating in a scenario‐based role‐playing experiment. After confirming experimental checks, we fitted a general linear mixed effects model to the data with appropriate controls. We find, ceteris paribus, that a critical‐component supplier with stellar historical performance is less likely to be terminated by the manufacturer than one with marginally‐acceptable historical performance. However, when a critical‐component supplier with stellar historical performance errs, its likelihood of being terminated by the manufacturer increases by a greater extent than when a supplier with marginally‐acceptable historical performance commits the same mistake. This positive supplier performance penalty effect contributes to the buyer‐supplier relationship dissolution literature by identifying how and why the deterrence to relationship dissolution typically engendered by stellar historical supplier performance does not hold. Our results have implications for how manufacturers should evaluate critical‐component suppliers and how critical‐component suppliers should manage ongoing strategic relationships with manufacturers.