Publications Database

Welcome to the new Schulich Peer-Reviewed Publication Database!

The database is currently in beta-testing and will be updated with more features as time goes on. In the meantime, stakeholders are free to explore our faculty’s numerous works. The left-hand panel affords the ability to search by the following:

  • Faculty Member’s Name;
  • Area of Expertise;
  • Whether the Publication is Open-Access (free for public download);
  • Journal Name; and
  • Date Range.

At present, the database covers publications from 2012 to 2020, but will extend further back in the future. In addition to listing publications, the database includes two types of impact metrics: Altmetrics and Plum. The database will be updated annually with most recent publications from our faculty.

If you have any questions or input, please don’t hesitate to get in touch.


Search Results

Bae, K., Baek, J.S., Kang, J.K. and Liu, W.L. (2012). "Do Controlling Shareholders’ Expropriation Incentives Imply a Link between Corporate Governance and Firm Value? Theory and Evidence", Journal of Financial Economics, 105(2), 412-435.

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Abstract We develop and test a model that investigates how controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives affect firm values during crisis and subsequent recovery periods. Consistent with the prediction of our model, we find that, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Asian firms with weaker corporate governance experience a larger drop in their share values but, during the post-crisis recovery period, such firms experience a larger rebound in their share values. We also find consistent evidence for Latin American firms during the 2001 Argentine economic crisis. Our results support the view that controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value.

Bae, K., Kim, S. and Kim, W. (2012). "Family Control and Expropriation at Not-for-Profit Organizations: Evidence from Korean Private Universities", Corporate Governance: An International Review, 20, 388-404.

Open Access Download

Abstract Manuscript Type: Empirical. Research Question/Issue: We study an agency problem in private universities – the conflict between controlling familiesand other stakeholders. We investigate whether universities over which controlling families have disproportionatelysignificant power relative to the amount of funds they contribute, that is, universities with high expropriation risk, areassociated with lower outside donations and poor quality. Research Findings/Insights: Using a sample of Korean private universities, we find that measures of family control inexcess of monetary contributions are negatively related to the level of outside donation and measures of university quality.We also find that universities at which the controlling family exerts disproportionate control are more likely to face disputesbetween the controlling family and other stakeholders. Finally, we show that our results are not driven by reverse causality. Theoretical/Academic Implications: While the existing literature on not-for-profit organizations focuses on the conflictbetween professional managers and other stakeholders, we study the conflict between controlling families and otherstakeholders. We investigate a situation in which the controlling family expropriates other stakeholders, a topic missingfrom the existing not-for-profit literature. Practitioner/Policy Implications: This study offers insights to policymakers interested in creating private universities in anemerging market setting. The relevance of our results is not limited to Korea. According to Altbach, family control of privateuniversities is prevalent in a number of countries, including Mexico, Thailand, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, the Philippines,Argentina, India, and China.