Publications Database

Welcome to the new Schulich Peer-Reviewed Publication Database!

The database is currently in beta-testing and will be updated with more features as time goes on. In the meantime, stakeholders are free to explore our faculty’s numerous works. The left-hand panel affords the ability to search by the following:

  • Faculty Member’s Name;
  • Area of Expertise;
  • Whether the Publication is Open-Access (free for public download);
  • Journal Name; and
  • Date Range.

At present, the database covers publications from 2012 to 2020, but will extend further back in the future. In addition to listing publications, the database includes two types of impact metrics: Altmetrics and Plum. The database will be updated annually with most recent publications from our faculty.

If you have any questions or input, please don’t hesitate to get in touch.

 

Search Results

Lévesque, M., Zhao, X. and J. Bian (2018). "Competitive Interplay of Production Decisions: Rivalry Between Established and Startup Firms", IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 65(1), 85-98.

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Keywords
Abstract This paper's novelty is the modeling of competition in production quantity and product-launch timing, which has been silent regarding the impact of these interdependent decisions on firm survival. We rigorously address the competitive interplay between a startup and an established rival by developing a game-theoretic model that captures the startup's vulnerability to failure through maximizing its survival likelihood. We allow the established rival to behave strategically by anticipating the startup's timing and production decisions prior to making its own production decision. We propose that unless the market-entry investment is low, a survival-maximizing startup should wait to launch its product, and do so with a larger production output than the established rival, when delaying the product launch enables the startup to charge a high price. Insights on the established firm involve the benefit from behaving strategically, which is when competing with either a survival-maximizing or profit-maximizing startup. If the market-entry investment is large, comparing a survival-maximizing startup with a profit-maximizing startup suggests that the former produces at a larger scale than the latter when either startup competes with an established rival, which in turn is forced to reduce its production level.

Arend, R., Lévesque, M. and M. Minniti (2017). "Managing New Technology Using Malleable Profit Functions", IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management, 64(2), 120-133.

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Keywords
Abstract Technological innovation drives economic growth, and the pioneering activity of scientists and engineers produce technological innovation. We provide a mathematical model of pioneering strategic choice by adopting a perspective familiar to microeconomics, but less common in the engineering management literature. Instead of focusing on the specific features of a pioneer's technology, we focus on the malleability of the profit equation involved. By considering the arguments of the profit function (i.e., entry and variable costs and potential market demand) as strategic levers, we derive propositions that identify the ranges of actions (lever pulling) available to managers to protect (and even increase) entrepreneurial rents in a simple yet robust partial equilibrium case. For each lever, we show that there are several value ranges (intervals) and that the pioneer's incentives vary across these intervals. In addition, for each lever, we identify the existence of nontrivial profit discontinuities that change the pioneer's incentives in surprising ways and lead to counterintuitive strategic choices. Lastly, we show that for some range of each lever's values, welfare-improving transfer payments are possible and, therefore, pioneers and policy-makers both have an incentive to bargain. As in the case of patents, these transfers encourage the introduction of new technologies.