Publications Database

Welcome to the new Schulich Peer-Reviewed Publication Database!

The database is currently in beta-testing and will be updated with more features as time goes on. In the meantime, stakeholders are free to explore our faculty’s numerous works. The left-hand panel affords the ability to search by the following:

  • Faculty Member’s Name;
  • Area of Expertise;
  • Whether the Publication is Open-Access (free for public download);
  • Journal Name; and
  • Date Range.

At present, the database covers publications from 2012 to 2020, but will extend further back in the future. In addition to listing publications, the database includes two types of impact metrics: Altmetrics and Plum. The database will be updated annually with most recent publications from our faculty.

If you have any questions or input, please don’t hesitate to get in touch.


Search Results

Balsam S, Fan H, Mawani A, and Zhang D (2022). "The Impact of the Use of Cross-border Compensation Peers: The Case of Canadian Companies Using U.S. Peers", Journal of Accounting, Auditing and Finance, 37(3): 562-585.

Open Access Download

Abstract CEO compensation in Canada is significantly lower than that in the U.S. In this paper we examine the choice of, and impact on Canadian CEO Compensation, of using U.S. firms in their compensation peer groups. Using a two-stage model to control for endogeneity, while we find the choice of peers associated with labor market factors, we still find that the use of US peers positively associated with higher Canadian CEO compensation. This finding is after controlling for the traditional determinants of CEO compensation, as well as use of domestic peers. While this result holds for all components of the compensation package, we also find that having U.S. peers is associated with a greater proportion of equity in the compensation package. Our results are robust to various formulations including change models, and using an earlier time period when peer disclosure was voluntary.

Tian, Y. (2017). "Managerial Gaming of Stock and Option Grants", Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments, 26(3), 127-152.

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Abstract In this paper, we examine managerial gaming of different types of equity grants, both at the initial award of the equity grants (front‐end gaming) and the unwinding of the equity holdings in the future (back‐end gaming). We find that the potential gains from stock price manipulation vary substantially across different types of equity grants. While traditional stock option grants are less vulnerable to front‐end gaming, they are more vulnerable to back‐end gaming than other types of equity grants (e.g., restricted stock grants). To prevent or discourage managerial gaming, firms should preset all terms of the equity grant in advance and link its future payoff to average stock prices (e.g., by granting Asian stock options).

Feng, Y., Nandy, D. and Tian, Y. (2015). "Executive Compensation and the Corporate Spin-off Decision", Journal of Economics and Business, 77, 94-117.

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Abstract We investigate the effect of CEO equity incentives on corporate spin-off decisions and find that CEOs with stronger equity incentives are, ceteris paribus, more likely to engage in corporate spin-offs (after correcting for potential endogeneity concerns). In addition to confirming previous findings that spin-offs are followed by positive announcement and long-run abnormal stock returns, we show that the level of the CEO's incentives matters. In particular, we find that while low incentive firms have a stronger announcement effect, high incentive firms experience better long run stock performance following spin-offs. This is consistent with the disciplining effect of spin-offs since low incentive firms are also found to have more independent boards. While a stronger board may be more influential on key corporate decisions (e.g., spin-offs), better incentive alignment leads to superior long run performance. Our results thus suggest that while stronger corporate governance may serve as a substitute mechanism for managerial equity incentives in the short run, they are in fact complementary in the long run.

Tian, Y. (2013). "Ironing out the Kinks in Executive Compensation: Linking Incentive Pay to Average Stock Prices", Journal of Banking and Finance, 37, 415-432.

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Abstract Traditional stock option grant is the most common form of incentive pay in executive compensation. Applying a principal-agent analysis, we find this common practice suboptimal and firms are better off linking incentive pay to average stock prices. Among other benefits, averaging reduces volatility by about 42%, making the incentive pay more attractive to risk-averse executives. Holding the cost of the option grant to the firm constant, Asian stock options are more cost effective than traditional stock options and provide stronger incentives to increase stock price. More importantly, the improvement is achieved with little impact on the option grant’s risk incentives (after adjusting for option cost). Finally, averaging also improves the value and incentive effects of indexed stock options.