Publications Database
Welcome to the new Schulich Peer-Reviewed Publication Database!
The database is currently in beta-testing and will be updated with more features as time goes on. In the meantime, stakeholders are free to explore our faculty’s numerous works. The left-hand panel affords the ability to search by the following:
- Faculty Member’s Name;
- Area of Expertise;
- Whether the Publication is Open-Access (free for public download);
- Journal Name; and
- Date Range.
At present, the database covers publications from 2012 to 2020, but will extend further back in the future. In addition to listing publications, the database includes two types of impact metrics: Altmetrics and Plum. The database will be updated annually with most recent publications from our faculty.
If you have any questions or input, please don’t hesitate to get in touch.
Search Results
Justin Y. Jin,Kiridaran Kanagaretnam and Na Li (2023). "The Impact of FASB Staff Position APB 14-1 on Corporate Financing: A Debt Contracting Perspective", Justin Y. Jin,Kiridaran Kanagaretnam and Na Li, 16(4), 213.
Abstract
Using a set of hand-collected data, we study the economic consequences of FASB Staff Position APB 14-1, which was adopted in 2008 and intended to increase reported interest expense and decrease reported leverage. First, we document that issuers are more likely to respond to APB 14-1 by reducing the outstanding amount of cash-settled convertible debt when they are more able to bear the cost of repurchase. Second, we explore the debt contracting explanations for issuers’ repurchase decisions. In particular, we focus on the contracting practice for GAAP changes and the inclusion of financial covenants related to interest coverage ratios. We find that issuers are less likely to repurchase the outstanding cash-settled convertibles when their bank loan contracts allow them to request a freeze on GAAP provisions to exclude mandatory GAAP changes in calculating accounting-based covenants. Further, when firms’ bank loan contracts contain financial covenants related to interest coverage ratios, issuers are more likely to repurchase outstanding cash-settled convertibles to avoid technical default due to the higher reported interest expense resulting from requirements under APB 14-1. These empirical results are consistent with the notion that firms do respond to mandatory GAAP changes when they are more able to afford the cost of such responses. Furthermore, debt contracting practices can help explain firms’ decisions to respond to mandatory GAAP changes.Dong, M., Dutordoir, M. and Veld, C. (2019). "How Can We Improve Inferences from Surveys? A New Look at the Convertible Debt Questions from the Graham and Harvey Survey Data", Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions & Money , 61, 213-222.
Abstract
We revisit the survey questions on convertible bond issue motives from the influential study of Graham and Harvey (2001). Our question-conditional analysis connecting survey answers with firm characteristics reveals that the conclusions on two of the four convertible debt theories from the original study need to be revised. More particularly, the delayed equity rationale and the sequential financing rationale on convertible bond issuance do not receive support from the question-conditional tests. Our results indicate that adding a question-conditional analysis is essential in obtaining correct inferences from survey data.Ming Dong, Marie Dutordoir, and Chris Veld (2018). "Why Do Firms Issue Convertible Bonds?", Critical Finance Review, 7, 111-164.
Abstract
We conduct interviews with financial managers in Australia, Canada, the U.K., and the U.S. to study the question why companies issue convertible bonds. For the vast majority of the firms, convertible bonds are chosen because managers find straight debt too costly. Convertible bonds are preferred to equity either because of the pecking order or because of managers’ perceived equity undervaluation and share dilution. Our results suggest that managers time the issuance of convertible bonds based on the demand of the investors and the misvaluation of the firms’ debt and equity. The evidence lends considerable support to the theory of management-investor differences in opinion about firm’s risk, but yields very little support to the theories of risk shifting, sequential financing, or backdoor equity.Dong, M., Dutordoir, M. and Veld, C. (2018). "Why Do Firms Issue Convertible Bonds?", Critical Finance Review, 7(1), 111-164.