Yuval Deutsch

Momentum theory suggests that acquisition experience leads to acquisition momentum in the form of a higher likelihood of subsequent acquisitions of the same type. However, this argument has been challenged theoretically and empirically. We reconcile conflicting predictions and findings of prior research and extend momentum theory by incorporating activity load as a novel causal mechanism to both replicate the base finding and explain deviations from it. We find that a high activity load due to increased acquisition activity acts as a counterforce to momentum, decreasing the likelihood of subsequent acquisitions of the same type. Moreover, we also find that the interplay of routines, cognitive frames, and activity load causes companies to alternate between different types of acquisitions – from small to large and from large to small – as management engages in attention modulation to preserve momentum. Taken together, our arguments and findings contribute to an improved understanding of temporal patterns of acquisition behaviour.

The market for acquisitions has been a blind spot in exploration-exploitation research in the new venture context. The introduction of the acquisition exit outcome as a performance dimension for new ventures, especially among high-tech ventures, shifts the traditional temporal logic of exploration-exploitation theory by introducing previously unacknowledged short-term benefits of exploration. We bring the acquisition outcome into the picture and investigate the relationship between the exploration-exploitation continuum and profitability, survival, and acquisition likelihood simultaneously. Using the Kauffman Firm Survey data, we provide evidence for a link between exploration and the likelihood of acquisition (defined as the business being sold to or merged with another business), although industry technology level poses a boundary condition such that the association is not observed in low- and medium-technology firms. An inverse U-shaped relationship that is monotone negative for most of the data range was found between exploration and the profitability of low- and medium-tech firms, and a negatively linear relationship was found for exploration and the profitability of high-tech firms. Our findings lend some support to the viability of “born to flip” strategies involving comparatively higher exploration levels in high-tech start-ups and sacrifice of short-term profitability.

Insight into organizational responses to stakeholder claims and influence attempts is critical to understand the challenges currently facing managers and organizations. Drawing on Kelman’s (1958) model of social influence, we advance the field’s understanding of the factors driving firm-level prioritization of competing stakeholder claims by developing a theoretical framework that accounts for both the stakeholder attributes that are important to relevant decision makers, and the decision makers’ motivations for accepting or rejecting the influence attempts of varying stakeholders. Our framework distinguishes itself from existing research by focusing on stakeholder prioritization, not salience, recognizing that stakeholder-related decisions result from group interaction and that important decision makers are not limited to those found within the classic boundaries of the firm. Consequently, we argue that decision makers are simultaneously stakeholders with attributes that might be relevant to other decision makers involved in prioritization. In addition, we identify a more extensive set of stakeholder attributes that includes powerlessness and illegitimacy.

Two obvious trends in corporate governance include broadening board accountability beyond shareholders’ interests and paying outside directors with equity compensation (stock and stock options). By integrating common agency and instrumental stakeholder theories, we examine the effect of stock compensation on secondary stakeholders and a firm’s participation in social issues, two areas where interests are less aligned with shareholder value. Consistent with our predictions, we found that while stock compensation may be an effective way to align directors’ goals to those of shareholders, it has adverse effects on important non-shareholder constituencies in the company’s operating environment.