Kevin Tasa

Trust serves as the foundation for social harmony and prosperity, but it is not always easy to build. When people see other groups as different, e.g., members of a different race or ethnicity, the perceived boundary often obstructs people from extending trust. This may result in interracial conflicts. The current research argues that individual differences in the lay theory of race can systematically influence the degree to which people extend trust to a racial outgroup in conflict situations. The lay theory of race refers to the extent to which people believe race is a malleable social construct that can change over time (i.e., social constructionist beliefs) versus a fixed essence that differentiates people into meaningful social categories (i.e., essentialist beliefs). In our three studies, we found evidence that social constructionist (vs. essentialist) beliefs promoted interracial trust in intergroup contexts, and that this effect held regardless of whether the lay theory of race was measured (Studies 1 and 3) or manipulated (Study 2), and whether the conflict was presented in a team conflict scenario (Study 1), social dilemma (Study 2), or a face-to-face dyadic negotiation (Study 3). In addition, results revealed that the lay theory’s effect on interracial trust could have critical downstream consequences in conflict, namely cooperation and mutually beneficial negotiation outcomes. The findings together reveal that the lay theory of race can reliably influence interracial trust and presents a promising direction for understanding interracial relations and improving intergroup harmony in society.

In three studies, we examined the relationship between implicit negotiation beliefs, moral disengagement, and a negotiator’s ethical attitudes and behavior. Study 1 found correlations between an entity theory that negotiation skills are fixed rather than malleable, moral disengagement, and appropriateness of marginally ethical negotiation tactics. Mediation analysis supported a model in which moral disengagement facilitated the relationship between entity theory and support for unethical tactics. Study 2 provided additional support for the mediation model in a sample of MBA students, whereby predispositions to morally disengage mediated the effect of dispositional entity beliefs on unethical behavior in a negotiation exercise. In study 3, we manipulated implicit beliefs prior to a negotiation simulation and found that entity beliefs predict deception through two sequential mediators, extreme opening bids and state moral disengagement.

In two studies, we investigated whether learning goals, which focus attention on task strategies rather than outcomes, affect negotiator behavior and results differently than performance goals. In Study 1, negotiators with learning goals had lower rates of impasse and were judged to be most cooperative. Study 2 replicated these results using a different task and also compared the impact of learning and performance goals to dispositional goal orientation. We found that implicit negotiation beliefs, derived from theories of dispositional goal orientation, were associated with value claiming and interacted with goal type such that the relationship was strongest in the learning goal condition. In addition, negotiators with learning goals developed greater understanding about their counterpart’s interests and created more integrative deals. These results show that negotiated outcomes are influenced by both goal type and the extent to which negotiators view their skills as malleable.

This study examines how group decision processes are affected by the perceived emergent expertise of a group member in situations where a correct solution is not readily verifiable. Using a moderately judgmental task, as opposed to an intellective task, the results of our experiment suggest that when group members are aware of performance feedback: (a) they gradually form a perception about their colleague’s expertise, (b) the emergence of expert recognition at the group level shifts the balance of individual influence on the group decision in favor of the expert, and (c) the group decision scheme thus changes as the perception of expertise emerges in the group. Moreover, the expert’s influence is stronger when there is a greater discrepancy between the expert’s proficiency and that of his or her fellow group members.