Publications Database

Welcome to the new Schulich Peer-Reviewed Publication Database!

The database is currently in beta-testing and will be updated with more features as time goes on. In the meantime, stakeholders are free to explore our faculty’s numerous works. The left-hand panel affords the ability to search by the following:

  • Faculty Member’s Name;
  • Area of Expertise;
  • Whether the Publication is Open-Access (free for public download);
  • Journal Name; and
  • Date Range.

At present, the database covers publications from 2012 to 2020, but will extend further back in the future. In addition to listing publications, the database includes two types of impact metrics: Altmetrics and Plum. The database will be updated annually with most recent publications from our faculty.

If you have any questions or input, please don’t hesitate to get in touch.


Search Results

V. Dhingra and H. Krishnan (Forthcoming). "Managing Reputation Risk in Supply Chains: The Role of Risk-sharing under Limited Liability", Management Science, 1-19.

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Abstract When a supplier fails to comply with social and environmental standards, the buyer’s reputation suffers. Reputation costs can typically be very high for the buyer, whereas the supplier’s liability is often limited. Conventional procurement strategies such as dual sourcing mitigate the buyer’s operational risk, but they often do so at the expense of increasing its reputation risk and sourcing costs. In this paper, we propose a risk-sharing contract for managing the buyer’s reputation concerns. We find that by sharing some of the supplier’s operational loss, the buyer may (in some conditions) decrease its reputational risk, but this has to be balanced against an increase in the operational risk. Risk sharing also reduces sourcing costs because the buyer takes on some of the worst-case loss of a wealth-constrained supplier. These results suggest that risk sharing can be superior, as a procurement strategy, to conventional approaches such as dual sourcing or penalty contracts. This is true when reputation and sourcing costs are a significant concern and operational costs are not that high. Under some conditions, the buyer may choose risk sharing even if it increases reputation risk in order to reduce procurement costs.

Farrar, J., Libby, T. and Thorne, L. (2015). "Groupcentric Budget Goals, Budget-Based Incentive Contracts, and Additive Group Tasks", Review of Accounting and Finance, 14(2), 189-206.

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Abstract Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of three different types of budget goals (egocentric individual, groupcentric individual and group) on group performance of an additive task, assigned within an individual budget-based incentive contract.While previous research has established that budget-based incentive contracts motivate higher group performance than piece rate contracts for additive group tasks, no studies, which we are aware of, have considered explicitly the type of goal within this context. Design/methodology/approach – We conduct a 3 2 experiment in which we manipulate the presence of an individual goal (egocentric, groupcentric and absent) and a group goal (present and absent) on group performance of an additive task. Findings – Group performance is higher for groups assigned groupcentric individual goals than for groups assigned egocentric individual goals, either alone or in combination with a group goal. Practical implications – Egocentric individual goals may reinforce an individualistic orientation, which may work against the potential gains from having group members adopt more of a group focus. Originality/value – This paper considers how groupcentric individual goals may improve group performance. The management accounting literature typically examines just egocentric individual goals.